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Abstract
This paper examines four equivalent methods of optimal monetary policymak-
ing, committing to the social loss function, using discretion with the central bank
long-run and short-run loss functions, and following monetary policy rules. All
lead to optimal economic performance. The same performance emerges from
these different policymaking methods because the central bank actually follows
the same (similar) policy rules. These objectives (the social loss function, the cen-
tral bank long-run and short-run loss functions) and monetary policy rules imply a
complete regime for optimal policy making. The central bank long-run and short-
run loss functions that produce the optimal policy with discretion differ from the
social loss function. Moreover, the optimal policy rule emerges from the opti-
mization of these different central bank loss functions.
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we consider the design of monetary policy – either a central bank objective 
function or a central bank policy rule – to optimize social welfare. We assume that the social 
welfare function corresponds to the representative household’s utility function, which 
captures the final objectives of monetary policy. As a practical matter, however, the central 
bank should not adopt the social welfare function as its “general targeting rule” (i.e., 
objective function) under discretion.1 That is, if the social welfare function incorporates the 
target values for the target variables that prove mutually inconsistent with the structure of the 
economy, then optimizing the social welfare function generates time inconsistency under 
rational expectations. Rather, the central bank’s general targeting rule must incorporate target 
values that prove mutually consistent with the structure of the economy. If so, then optimal 
policy that optimizes the social welfare function will prove consistent as well. 
The central bank’s general targeting rule (i.e., objective function) implies a “specific 
targeting rule” (i.e., policy rule), which also ensures that optimal policy proves consistent.2 
We find, however, that an infinite number of general targeting rules associate with a specific 
targeting rule. Once again, the specific targeting rule (i.e., central bank policy rule) ensures 
that we optimize the social welfare function and that we adopt an optimal and consistent 
policy. 
                                                        
1 Svensson (2003) defines a general targeting rule as incorporating “the objectives to be achieved, for instance, 
by listing the target variables, the targets (target levels) for those variables, and the (explicit or implicit) loss 
function to be minimized.” (p. 429). Moreover, Svensson (2003) argues “general targeting rules essentially 
specify operational objectives for monetary policy …” (p. 430). 
2 Svensson (2003) defines a specific targeting rule “specifies conditions for the target variables (or forecasts of 
the target variables), for instance, like the … rule of thumb of the Bank of England and the Riksbank.” (p. 429). 
Moreover, Svensson (2003) argues “specific targeting rules essentially specify operational Euler conditions for 
monetary policy.” (p. 430). 
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Rogoff (1985), Walsh (1995, 2003), Svensson (1997b), and others adopt the notion 
that the central bank with discretionary policy employs an objective function (i.e., general 
targeting rule) differing from the social welfare function to ensure optimal policy proves 
consistent. For instance, Walsh (2003, p. 276) states, “I have assumed the relevant policy 
regime is one of discretion, and the problem faced in designing policy is to assign a loss 
function to the central bank.” Similarly, Svensson (1999, p. 636) states “Both money-growth 
targeting and nominal-GDP targeting are interpreted as intermediate-targeting rules, that is, 
the assignment or adoption of an intermediate loss function with money growth or nominal 
GDP as a target variable. Since the purpose of an intermediate-targeting strategy is to fulfill 
some final loss function, the performance of the intermediate-targeting rule must be evaluated 
according to that final loss function rather than to the intermediate loss function.” In our 
context, the intermediate loss function refers to the central bank objective function (i.e., 
general targeting rule), which takes the same form as the social loss function but with 
different parameters. Yuan and Miller (2007a, 2006) and Yuan, Miller and Chen (2007b) 
argue that the social welfare criterion (loss function) proves inappropriate for the direct 
central bank objective function in monetary policymaking, because the target levels in the 
social loss function are inconsistent with each other and the central bank under discretion 
faces a dilemma if delegated the social loss function. This paper extends Yuan, Miller and 
Chen (2007b) with static Barro-Gordon model by using a dynamic backward-looking model 
with employment persistence. 
In sum, we explore the delegation of central bank objective functions and policy rules 
to produce optimal and consistent policy outcomes. The rest of this introduction provides 
 3
background information on these issues. 
Central Bank Intertemporal (long-run) Loss Function 
Designing a scientific and direct objective for monetary policy is one of the main tasks of this 
paper. We will show that the equilibrium (i.e., discretion or consistent) policy under the 
designed and delegated central bank objective function replicates the optimal policy under the 
social welfare function with commitment. That is, the consistent policy under the designed 
and delegated objective function proves optimal under the social welfare criterion. So 
designing the direct central bank objective function for monetary policy serves as a means, 
not an end in itself, to optimizing the social welfare.  
The designed and delegated monetary policy (central bank) objective function 
possesses a straightforward interpretation. It exhibits four characteristics (properties). First, 
the equilibrium (consistent) policy under the designed and delegated objective function 
replicates the optimal policy under the social welfare function with commitment. Thus, 
consistency and optimality reconcile under the designed and delegated objective function. 
Second, the target levels in the designed and delegated objective function prove moderate, in 
that they are attainable, on average, each period. Thus, the central bank can easily earn 
credibility and accountability. Third, the target level of employment (output) equals the 
natural (potential) one. This well-known outcome requires that the central bank not adopt an 
output bias in its direct objective function. Moreover, as Svensson (2002) argues “There is 
general agreement that inflation-targeting central banks do normally not have overambitious 
output targets, that is, exceeding potential output.” (p. 774). Our paper arrives at this result 
from a different direction. Fourth, the relative weight placed on the two target variables -- 
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inflation and output (employment) -- reflects the social preference, as well as the economic 
structure. These four properties exhibit robustness because they also hold in Yuan and Miller 
(2007a, 2006) and Yuan, Miller and Chen (2007b). 
Svensson (2003) writes:  
What are the problems with a commitment to a general targeting rule? One 
problem is that the objectives may still not be sufficiently well specified 
not to be open to interpretation. For instance, the relative weight on 
output-gap stabilization in flexible inflation targeting… is not directly 
specified by any inflation-targeting central bank… 
A second potential problem… is the potential consequences of the 
discretionary optimization under a commitment to a general targeting rule, 
more precisely that such discretionary optimization is not fully optimal in 
a situation with forward-looking variables.3 (p. 454.) 
Our paper to some extent solves the above two problems in theory -- how to design a direct 
central bank objective function for monetary policy and how to implement optimal 
discretionary (consistent) policy. 
In addition, similarity exists between our findings and those of Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999) “The solution under commitment in this case perfectly resembles the solution 
that would obtain for a central bank with discretion that assigned to inflation a higher cost 
than the true social cost” (p. 1681) What differs? They place more weight on inflation 
variability; we put more weight on employment (output) gap variability. The difference 
results from different models. Intuitively, with employment persistence, any employment gap 
not eliminated today persists into the future and, thus, induces more loss. To reduce loss, we 
place more weight on employment. 
                                                        
3 The backward-looking models in Svensson (1997a, 2003) actually conform to dynamic programming 
problems, not games. Inconsistency issues of optimal policy do not exist in these backward-looking models, but 
do exist in the forward-looking model of Svensson (2003). Though our model is backward-looking with 
employment persistence, the inconsistency issue of optimal policy exists. We use the backward-looking model 
of Svensson (1997b) in our paper to illustrate our ideas. Using a forward-looking model makes our ideas less 
transparent because of more complicated mathematics. 
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Monetary Policy Rules 
The property of optimal and consistent policy proves a good outcome. But, why? In 
contemplating the answer, we find that the reason proves surprisingly simple. That is, the 
first-order condition of the value function under the designed and delegated central bank 
objective function with discretion exactly equals the first-order condition of the value 
function under the social welfare function with commitment. As a result, discretionary policy 
under the designed and delegated objective function replicates the commitment policy under 
the social objective function. From this view, monetary policy rules appear more basic than 
the objectives functions. We also examine such policy rules in this paper. 
Different meanings for monetary policy rules exist in literature. When rules appear in 
the phrase “rules versus discretion”, rules mean commitment. That is, McCallum (2004) 
states, for example, that “monetary policy is conducted … in a ’rule-based’ manner that views 
policy as an ongoing process” (p. 367), rather than on a period-by-period basis. When rules 
appear in “Taylor rules” or “McCallum rules,” rules mean instrument rules in response to 
current economic conditions. Svensson (2003) argues, “the concept of monetary-policy rules 
should be broadened beyond the narrow instrument rules and also include targeting rules.” (p. 
466). We define a monetary policy rule as a central bank’s behavior equation, which equals 
an explicit or implicit function of instruments or target variables in relation with 
predetermined variables and structural shocks. So, we differentiate between a “rule” versus 
an “objective”, as does Cecchetti (2000). In addition, we also assume with Cecchetti (2000) 
that a rule responds to economic variables as well as demand and supply shocks, if the rule 
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performs at its best.4 Moreover, monetary policy rules in our definition prove broader than 
instrument rules. They can reflect specific targeting rules or instrument rules in Svensson’s 
terms, depending on the assumptions and the economic structure that we use. If the economic 
structure involves only an aggregate supply function and the central bank directly controls a 
target variable, then the optimal monetary policy rule is a specific targeting rule, which 
includes target variables, predetermined variables, and structural shocks. If the economic 
structure involves both aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions and the central 
bank directly controls an instrument (not a target variable), then a monetary policy rule is an 
instrument rule, which includes target variables, predetermined variables, structural shocks, 
as well as the instrument variable. 
This paper identifies four ways to obtain optimal policy rules -- derived from the 
first-order condition of the value function of the social welfare function under commitment, 
derived from the first-order condition of the value function of the central bank long-run and 
short-run objective functions under discretion, and derived from optimizing the social welfare 
function using our definition of a monetary policy rule. To concentrate on the main issues, we 
consider only specific targeting rules. We can easily obtain optimal instrument rules, however, 
by combining specific targeting rules with the aggregate demand function. 
Given our definitions of monetary policy objectives and rules, our paper concludes 
that monetary policy objectives and rules can theoretically play the same role in monetary 
policymaking. Specifically, the four optimal policymaking methods -- commitment to the 
social welfare objective, discretion and the designed and delegated long-run and short-run 
                                                        
4 Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Svensson (1997a, 2002, 2003) apparently regard monetary policy rules as 
mechanical responses to current and forecast variables, excluding responses to shocks.  
 7
central bank objective functions,5 and just follow the designed and delegated policy rule -- 
yield equivalent outcomes. They all produce the same optimal and consistent outcomes. This 
conclusion seemingly contradicts Svensson’s (1997a) argument “Commitment to ‘target 
rules’ may be better than commitment to ‘instrument rules’.” (p. 1111).6 The contradiction, 
however, occurs because of different assumptions concerning knowledge about the economic 
structure as well as a difference in the understanding of the rules. No essential conflicts exist 
in the debate on whether targeting rules prove superior to instrument rules. With imperfect 
knowledge about the economic structure, targeting rules (general targeting rules and specific 
targeting rules) may dominate instrument rules. More specifically, with imperfect knowledge 
about the aggregate supply function, general targeting rules may dominate specific targeting 
rules. With perfect knowledge about the aggregate supply function, however, using general 
targeting rules or specific targeting rules makes no difference. With perfect knowledge about 
the aggregate supply function and imperfect knowledge about the aggregate demand function, 
specific targeting rules may dominate instrument rules. Still, with perfect knowledge about 
the economic structure (aggregate supply and demand functions), general targeting rules, 
specific targeting rules, and instrument rules prove essentially the same.  
Assuming imperfect knowledge about the economic structure is more realistic and 
practical. Since our theoretical paper only addresses the issues of the consistency and 
optimality of monetary policy (not the practical implementation of monetary policy, such as 
in Svensson, 1997a), we assume perfect knowledge about the economic structure by the 
                                                        
5 We discuss the central bank short-run objective function in the next subsection. 
6 As noted before, Svensson’s (2003) target rules include general targeting rules and specific targeting rules. 
General targeting rules specify an operational objective for monetary policy with a commitment to that objective. 
Monetary policy rules in our context prove broader than, and thus include, instrument rules. 
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central bank and the public. Under this assumption and our definition of monetary policy 
rules, it makes no difference whether the central bank operates monetary policy by 
optimizing policy objectives7 or by following policy rules.  
Central-Bank Period (Short-Run) Loss Function 
In this paper, we also consider myopic policy. Generally an equilibrium of an 
infinite-period dynamic game requires strong assumptions, including that all players possess 
high intelligence and make no mistakes. Accordingly, we assume that a boundedly rational 
central bank operates policy myopically, minimizing only the current period loss. We still 
hope, however, that the myopic equilibrium policy replicates the optimal policy.  
For convenience, we define the short-run objective function, where a 
bounded-rational central bank optimizes the period objective, and the long-run objective 
function, where an unbounded central bank optimizes the intertemporal objective. We find 
that the optimal short-run objective in each period equals the period objective of the designed 
long-run objective. We interpret this result roughly as follows. Recall that one characteristic 
of the designed and delegated long-run objective function is that target levels are realized 
each period, on average. That is, the central bank minimizes the loss each period at zero, 
resulting in the optimization of the intertemporal objective function. In other words, as long 
as the central bank currently minimizes each period’s loss function of the intertemporal 
objective, the myopic equilibrium policies of all periods replicates the optimal policy path. In 
other words, minimizing the intertemporal loss function also minimizes the period loss 
function. In short, no intertemporal loss substitution occurs. Similarly, the first-order 
                                                        
7 Optimizing policy objectives means either optimizing the social welfare objective with commitment, or 
optimizing the direct central bank objective function with discretion. 
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condition of the optimal short-run objective function replicates the optimal policy rule. 
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its commitment 
(optimal) and discretion (consistent) policy. Consistent policy does not prove optimal. 
Section 3 designs the central-bank intertemporal (long-run) loss function. We find the 
discretionary policy under the designed and delegated central-bank intertemporal (long-run) 
loss function replicates optimal policy and the loss function possesses a straightforward 
interpretation. Discretionary policy under the designed and delegated central-bank loss 
function replicates the optimal policy because the first-order conditions of their value 
functions (the designed and delegated central-bank intertemporal loss function and the social 
intertemporal loss function) prove identical. As a result, Section 4 studies monetary policy 
rules, providing three ways of designing optimal monetary policy rules. Section 5 designs the 
central-bank period (short-run) loss function. We obtain intuitive results. The designed and 
delegated central-bank period loss function coincides with the period loss function of the 
designed and delegated central-bank intertemporal loss function, implying that the first-order 
condition of the designed and delegated central-bank period loss function also replicates the 
optimal policy rule. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Optimal and Consistent Policy in a Simple Model  
The model follows the analysis of Svensson (1997b).8 Society minimizes the following 
intertemporal (long-run) loss function: 
(1)  , 10
1
t
t
t
E Lβ∞ −
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
where the discount factor equals β, 0 < β < 1, E equals the mathematical expectations 
                                                        
8 See footnote 3 for the reasons that we use the model in Svensson (1997b). 
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operator, and the period (short-run) loss function equals Lt. The period loss function equals 
the following: 
(2)  ( ) ( ) (2 2* * * *1, ; , , 2t t t t tL L π π λ π π λ )⎡ ⎤≡ = − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? ? ? , 
where π equals the inflation rate,  equals the natural logarithm of the employment rate (i.e., 
the share of employment in full employment), starred values identify society’s target values 
for the inflation and employment rates, and λ measures the relative importance of 
employment and inflation deviations from their target rates. 
?
The economic structure equals the following two-equation system, which incorporates 
employment persistence:  
(3)  ( )1 et t t t tρ α π π ε−= + − +? ?  and 
(4)  ( )1et t tEπ π−= ,  
where tε  equals the white noise random shock with variance equal to 2σ . Note that the 
steady-state value of  equals zero, since at full employment, the employment rate equals 
one and its natural logarithm equals zero. Thus, the case without persistence (i.e., ρ = 0) 
corresponds to the standard Barro-Gordon (1983) model. 
?
Optimal Policy (Benchmark) 
Assume that the government directly controls the central bank and that the government can 
commit to a state-contingent rule on the inflation rate. The Bellman equation for determining 
the optimal policy and outcomes from the optimization equals the following: 
(5)  * * 2 * 21 1
,
1( ) min ( ) ( ) ( )
2et tt t t t
V E V
π π
π π λ β− − ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭? ? ?
*
t? . 
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We minimize this equation subject to the economic structure given in equations (3) and (4).9
The solution for  must equal a quadratic form, since we minimize the 
quadratic objective function subject to linear constraints. Thus, the hypothesized solution 
equals the following equation: 
*
1( tV −? )
(6)  ( )* * *0 1 212t tV * 2tγ γ γ= + +? ? ? , 
where we need to determine the unknown coefficients in equation (6). The solution equals the 
following: 
(7)  
*
*
1 1
λργ βρ= − −
?  and 
2
*
2 21
λργ βρ= − . 
The solution for the optimal policy produces the following: 
(8)  * *
t
optimal
tbπ π ε= − , 
where * 21
b 2
λα
βρ λα= − + . The optimal employment rate equals the following: 
(9)  
2
1 2 2
1
1t
optimal
t t
βρρ εβρ λα−
−= + − +? ? . 
Consistent (Discretionary) Policy  
Now, assume that the government still directly controls the central bank, but it cannot commit 
to a state-contingent rule on the inflation rate. As such, the decision problem of the 
government takes the expected inflation rate as a given. That is, no longer does the 
government internalize the effects of its decisions on the expected inflation rate. 
Carrying out the optimization produces the following consistent inflation and 
employment rates:10
                                                        
9 Lockwood et al. (1995) and Svensson (1997b) provide more details of the derivation. 
10 Svensson (1997b) also reports two additional existence conditions in his Appendix.  
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(10)  1t
discretion
t ta b cπ ε −= − − ?  and 
(11)  1 (1 )t
discretion
t tbρ α ε−= + −? ? , 
where  
  
( )
( )
* 2
*
2 2
22 2 2 2
, , and 
1 1
1 1 1 4 .
2
ca b
c c
c
λα λα βαπ βρ βα βρ α λα βα
βρ βρ λα βραβρ
+= + =− − − + +
⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?
 
Comparing equations (8) and (10), the inflation bias in the consistent inflation rate 
under discretion equals the following: 
(12)  * *1 ( )t
discretion optimal
t ta c b b tπ π π −− = − − − −? ε . 
The inflation bias includes an average inflation bias ( *a π− ), a state-contingent inflation bias 
( ), and a stabilization inflation bias [1tc −− ? *( ) tb b ε− − ]. 
In sum, consistent policy does not prove optimal. 
3 Design of Central Bank Long-Run Loss Functions  
We show in the prior section that discretion produces a consistent, but non-optimal, policy. 
That finding implicitly assumes that the central bank adopts the social loss function as its 
own loss function. Our paper first considers delegating a loss function to the central bank that 
differs from the social loss function, but that delivers the optimal outcomes when the central 
bank adopts a consistent policy based on the delegated loss function. That is, can we find a 
loss function that when delegated to the central bank yields optimal outcomes? 
When the central bank minimizes the intertemporal expected loss from the current and 
all future periods, we call that objective function the long-run central-bank loss function. This 
Section examines this problem. Correspondingly, when the central bank only minimizes the 
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current-period expected loss, we call that objective function the short-run central-bank loss 
function. Section 5 considers the current-period expected-loss minimization problem. 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the long-run (intertemporal) social loss function and 
its short-run (period) component. The proposed delegated central bank short-run (period) loss 
function equals the following expression: 
(13)  ( ) ( )2 212b b bt t t t tL π π λ b⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? , 
where  equal state-contingent targets (i.e.,  and btπ ?bt 10 1=bt tg gπ −+ ?  and  0 1bt th h 1−= +? ? ). 
That is, the proposed delegated short-run central bank loss function mirrors the short-run 
social loss function, but with potentially different parameters. Moreover, the proposed 
short-run loss function allows state-continent targets to reflect the persistence of employment 
in the economy. 
Based on the discussion in the Introduction that central-bank loss function serves as a 
means to the end—minimization of the social long-run loss function, we design the central 
bank loss function through the following model: 
(14) 
( ) ( )
{ } ( ) (
( )
( )
0 1 0 1
1
2 21 * *
0
, , , , 1
2 21
0 0 1 1 0
1
1
1
1min
2
1min
2
. .
. .
b
t t
t
t tg g h h t
t b
t t t t
t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
E
E g g h h
s t
s t
E
λ
π
β π π λ
β π λ
ρ α π π ε
π π
∞
=
∞ −
=
∞ −
− −
=
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎧ ⎫)1 1⎡ ⎤⋅ − − + − −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎪⎨ ⎧ = + − +⎪⎪ ⎨⎪ =⎪⎩⎩
∑
∑
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
. 
We solve this model in two steps and obtain an infinite number of optimal central 
bank loss functions. With more assumptions, we pin down the unique reasonable central bank 
loss function from the infinite number of optimal candidates. Specifically, Step I solves the 
following partial model: 
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(15)  
{ } ( ) (
( )
( )
1
2 21
0 0 1 1 0
1
1
1
1min
2
. .
t t
t b
t t t t
t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
E g g h h
s t
E
π
β π λ
ρ α π π ε
π π
∞
=
∞ −
− −
=
−
−
)1 1⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − − + − −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = + − +⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
∑ ? ? ?
? ? . 
That is, Step I proposes a class of loss functions, involving parameters that define the precise 
function chosen from the class of functions, and derives a consistent policy when the central 
bank minimizes that class of loss functions subject to the economic structure. Clearly, the 
consistent policy will depend on the parameters that define the precise loss function chosen 
from the class of loss functions. The consistent (equilibrium) inflation and employment rates 
equal:11
(16)  ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 1 1 1 2 1 (1 )b b bt t tqg h g hπ α λ βγ λ α αρ λ βγ εα− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − + + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ?  and 
(17)  1t t q tρ ε−= +? ? , 
where   2 21 [1 ( )]
bq α λ βγ= + + , 
(18)  ( ) ( )2 2 22 1 2 1b b bh h 2γ λ α αρ λ βγ λ ρ βγ ρ⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦  or ( )2 2 1,b hγ γ λ≡ , and 
(19)  ( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 1 2 0 1b b b bh h h h 1γ α λ βγ λ α αρ λ βγ λ ρ βγ ρ⎡ ⎤= − − + + − +⎣ ⎦  or 
   ( )1 1 0 1, ,b h hγ γ λ≡ .12
Given the solution for the consistent or equilibrium outcomes for inflation and 
employment that depend on the parameters of the central bank loss function (i.e., 
0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ ), Step II choose values for those parameters to minimize the expected 
intertemporal social loss. The analytical problem equals the following: 
                                                        
11 Equations (16) and (17) equal, respectively, equations  (A-8) and (A-9) in Appendix A. 
12 Equations (18) and (19) equal, respectively, equations (A-10) and (A-11) in Appendix A. 
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(20)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 0 1
2 21 * *
0
, , , , 1
0 0 1 1 1 2 1
1
1min
2
1
. .
b
t
t t
g g h h t
b b b
t t t
t t t
E
q
g h g hs t
q
λ
β π π λ
π α λ βγ λ α αρ λ βγ εα
ρ ε
∞ −
=
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
−⎧ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − + + − + −⎪ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎨⎪ = +⎩
∑ ? ?
?
? ?
. 
The problem yields the following first-order conditions:13
(21)  ( ) *0 0 1 0bg hα λ βγ π+ − − =
) =
, 
(22)  , and ( ) (1 1 2 0b bg hλ α αρ λ βγ+ − +
(23)  
2
2 2
2
1 1
1 ( ) 1b
q βρ 2α λ βγ βρ λα
⎧ ⎫ −= =⎨ ⎬+ + − +⎩ ⎭
. 
By using equations (21) to (23), the consistent policy outcomes for the inflation and 
employment rates (16) and (17) equal: 
(24)  * 2 21t t
λαπ π εβρ λα= − − +  and 
(25)  
2
1 2 2
1
1t t
βρ
tρ εβρ λα−
−= + − +? ? , 
which equal their optimal outcomes. See equations (8) and (9). 
Generally, model (14) leads to an infinite set of possible central bank loss functions, 
since the class of loss functions contains more than the minimum number of parameters 
needed to lead to a solution of the minimization. Specifically, as long as the 7 parameters, 
0 1 0 1 1,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h 2λ γ γ
                                                       
, of the central bank loss function, satisfy equations (18), (19), 
(21), (22), and (23), the consistent policy will prove optimal. 
Among the infinite number of optimal candidates for the central bank loss functions, 
does one appear more reasonable? Yes. We argue that the chosen parameters should also 
minimize the designed and delegated central bank loss function itself. This idea pins down a 
 
13 Equations (21), (22) and (23) equal, respectively, equations (A-16), (A-17) and (A-18) in Appendix A. 
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unique central bank loss function. The problem equals the  following: 
(26)  
( ) ( ){ }
0 1 0 1
2 21
0 0 1 1 0 1
, , , , 1
*
2 2
2
1 2 2
1min
2
1
. .
1
1
b
t b
t t t tg g h h t
t t
t t t
E g g h h
s t
λ
β π λ
λαπ π εβρ λα
βρρ εβρ λα
∞ −
− −
=
−
⎧ ⎫− + + − + 1⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = −⎪ − +⎪⎨ −⎪ = +⎪ − +⎩
∑ ? ? ?
? ?
. 
The optimization yields the following solution:14
(27)  *0 1 0 1, 0, 0 and g g h hπ ρ= = = = . 
Equivalently, 
(28)  . * 1 and 
b b
t tπ π ρ −= =? ? t
Moreover, if ρ equals zero, then  equals zero or full employment, given that hbt? 0 equals zero. 
Viewing the problem somewhat differently, but leading to the same conclusion, 
modern central banks must account for their actions. How can we make central banks 
accountable? We do so by delegating achievable target levels. The central bank, constrained 
by the economic structure, will face a dilemma if it cannot achieve the delegated target levels. 
That is, we assume the delegated target levels are averagely attainable: 
(29)  ( ) ( )1 1 and b bt t t t t tE Eπ π− −= =? ? . 
Thus, since  from equations (24) and (25) hold for each of 
the optimal central bank loss functions, equation (28) also holds. 
( ) ( )*1 1=  and t t t t tE Eπ π ρ− − =? ? 1−
Finally, we determine the optimal central bank long-run loss function as follows:15
(30)  ( ) ( )2 212b b bt t t t tL π π λ b⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? ,  
where * 21, , and [ /(1
b b b
t t t )]π π ρ λ λ βρ−= = = −? ? . 
                                                        
14 Equation (27) equals equation (A-25) in Appendix A. 
15 See Appendix A for further details. 
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Three observations emerge from these findings. First, the parameter values that 
minimize both the social and central banker loss functions (i.e., the unique solutions) 
simultaneously imply that the targets in the central banker loss function prove rational, in the 
sense that the expected inflation and employment rates equal the central banker targets. That 
is,  
(31)  ( ) ( )1 1 and b bt t t t tE Eπ π− −= =? ? t
t
. 
In addition, the result of  means that the optimal employment target should equal 
the potential employment level each period. This result proves consistent with “general 
agreement that inflation-targeting central banks do normally not have overambitious output 
targets, that is, exceeding potential output (Svensson, 2002, p. 774)”, and also conforms to 
Blinder’s intuition “I can assure you that it would not surprise my central banker friends to 
learn that economic theories that model them as seeking to drive unemployment below the 
natural rate imply that their policies are too inflationary. They would no doubt reply, ‘Of 
course that would be inflationary. That’s why we do not do it.’(Blinder, 1998, p. 42-43)” 
1
b
t ρ −=? ?
Second, Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central banker proposal (i.e., bλ λ< ) proves 
inconsistent with our finding. To compare with Rogoff’s model, which does not incorporate 
employment persistence, we set 0ρ = . Then, bλ λ= .16 With employment persistence, we 
find that a less-conservative central banker than society proves optimal, since 
(32)  bλ λ> . 
Intuitively, employment persistence in our model means that any employment gap not 
eliminated today persists into future, and thus induces loss. To reduce loss, more weight goes 
                                                        
16 Yuan, Miller and Chen (2007b) discuss the result of bλ λ= . 
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on the employment target. 
Finally, our specification that achieves the optimal outcomes involves delegating to 
the central bank an inflation target equal to the social inflation target (i.e., *bπ π= ), a 
state-contingent employment target equal to the short-run natural rate of employment (i.e., 
-1=
b
tρ? ? ), and an employment weight in the central bank short-run (period) loss function 
greater than the social weight (i.e., weight-liberal central bank, 2[ /(1 )]bλ λ βρ λ= − > ). This 
offers a solution that differs from that proposed in Svensson (1997b). 
4. Design of Monetary Policy Rules 
Until now, we present two methods of implementing an optimal monetary policy -- 
commitment to the social loss function and discretion to the designed and delegated central 
bank loss function. The two methods achieve the same optimal outcomes, since the first-order 
condition of the value function of the social loss function with commitment equals the 
first-order condition of the value function of the designed and delegated central bank loss 
function with discretion. That is, although it appears that policy operates in different ways, 
the central bank actually follows the same behavioral equation, inevitably resulting in the 
same economic performance. As a result, monetary policy rules can theoretically play the 
same role in policymaking as monetary policy objectives. 
As defined in the Introduction, a monetary policy rule specifies a behavioral equation 
for the central bank. It can include predetermined variables, target variables, instrument 
variables, as well as structural shocks. No instrument variables appear in our monetary policy 
rules because we assume that the central bank directly controls the inflation rate, the target 
variable. So we study only ‘specific targeting rules’ in Svensson’s terminology. We can easily 
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derive instrument rules, however, from specific targeting rules and an aggregate demand 
function. 
We now present three methods of deriving optimal monetary policy rules. Two reflect 
the first-order conditions mentioned above. The third method mirrors the method of 
designing and delegating a central bank loss function, by choosing parameters from policy 
rules that minimize the social loss. Actually, the third method frequently appears in the 
literature. 
First-Order Condition of Commitment to the Social Loss Function 
Repeat the Bellman equation (5) as follows: 
(5)  * * 2 * 21 1
,
1( ) min ( ) ( ) ( )
2et tt t t t
V E V
π π
π π λ β− − ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭? ? ?
*
t? . 
The first-order condition equals: 
(33)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * *1 0t t t t t tV E Vπ π λα αβ λα αβ− ⎡ ⎤− + − + − − + =⎣ ⎦? ?? ? ? ? ? ? . 
Substituting ( )* *1 2t tV *γ γ= +? ? ? , ( )1 1t t tE ρ− −=? ?  and 
2
*
2 21
λργ βρ= −  into equation 
(33) eventually reduces to: 
(34)  ( ) ( )* 12 01t t tλαπ π ρβρ −− + − =− ? ? . 
This defines the specific targeting rule.  
To express the policy rule as an explicit function of predetermined variables ( etπ  and 
) and structural shocks (1t−? tε ) substitute ( )1 et t t t tρ α π π ε−= + − +? ?  into equation (34) 
and rearrange terms to give: 
(35)  
2 2
*
2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1 1 1
e
t t
βρ λα λα
tπ π πβρ λα βρ λα βρ λα
−= + −− + − + − + ε . 
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This defines the optimal monetary policy rule. 
First-Order Condition of Discretion with the Designed and Delegated Central Bank Loss 
Function 
The Bellman equation for this problem equals the following:17
(36)  ( ) ( ){ }1 1 min
t
b
t t t tV E L Vπ β− −= +? ? , 
where ( ) ( )2 2* 112b bt t t tL π π λ ρ −⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? . 
The first-order condition equals: 
(37)  ( ) ( ) ( )* 1 0bt t t Vπ π λ α ρ αβ−− + − + =?? ? ? t
t
. 
Note that ( ) 1 2tV γ γ= +? ? ? . Also, Appendix A demonstrates that 1 2 0γ γ= = .18 Thus, 
equation (37) reduces to: 
(38)  , ( ) ( )* 1 0bt t tπ π λ ρ −− + − =? ?
where 2[ /(1 )]bλ λ βρ= − . Policy rule (38) replicates the rule (34). 
Policy Rules that Minimize the Social Loss Function 
The method of designing policy rules in this subsection is actually used frequently in the 
existing literature (e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999). Results, however, depend on the 
correct definition of monetary policy rules. As mentioned in the Introduction, monetary 
policy rules in our context imply that the control target variable ( tπ ) depends on 
predetermined variables ( etπ  and 1t−? ) and structural shocks ( tε ) as follows: 
(39)  1
e
t t ta b c d tπ π ε−= + + +? . 
The central bank just follows the delegated policy rule (24). Thus, the model used to design 
the optimal policy rule equals the following: 
                                                        
17 See Appendix A, equation (A-4). 
18 See Appendix A, equations (A-26) and the related discussion.. 
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(40)  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 21 * *
0, , , 1
1
1
1
1min
2
. .
t
t ta b c d t
e
t t t t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
E
a b c d
s t
E
β π π λ
π π ε
ρ α π π ε
π π
∞ −
=
−
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = + + +⎪⎪ = + − +⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
∑ ? ?
?
? ?
. 
The design of an optimal policy rule proceeds in two steps. Step I derives the 
equilibrium outcomes, given the policy rule. Step II chooses the parameters from the policy 
rule that minimize the social loss function. The optimal policy equal:19
(41)  ( ) * 2 21 1et tb b t
λαπ π π βρ λα= − + − − + ε
1
, 
where . The equilibrium inflation and employment rates equal the following: 0 b≤ <
(42)  * 2 21t t
λαπ π εβρ λα= − − +  and 
(43)  
2
1 2 2
1
1t t
βρ
tρ εβρ λα−
−= + − +? ? , 
which equal the optimal outcomes. See equations (8) and (9). 
Three characteristics of policy rule (41) emerge. First, it proves optimal because the 
equilibrium outcomes remain optimal as long as the central bank follows the rule. Second, the 
shock coefficient equals that of rule (35). That is, a unique way exists to respond optimally to 
the supply shock. Third, a class of optimal policy rules exists, which include the special case 
of rule (35). Without considering shocks, any inflation rate can do as long as it equals the 
weighted average of social target value and the private sector’s inflation expectation, or in the 
simplest case, the inflation rate equals the social target *  ( 0,  0t tbπ π ε )= = = . 
 
                                                        
19 See Appendix B for details. 
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5. Design of Central Bank Short-Run Loss Functions 
From our prior discussion, we know that the central bank can implement optimal policy by 
committing to the social intertemporal loss function, using discretion to the designed and 
delegated central bank intertemporal loss function, or just following the delegated optimal 
policy rule. 
Supporting the equilibrium of an infinite-period dynamic game requires strong 
assumptions and making no mistakes, including extremely intelligent players. Shubik (1998) 
argues “…it can be proved that chess is an ‘inessential game,’ i.e., if one could do all the 
calculations there would be no reason to play chess as each side would have an optimal 
strategy (Zermelo, 1912).” (p. 3). Accordingly, we assume in this section that the central bank 
possesses bounded rationality and only minimizes the current period’s central bank loss 
function. That is, the central bank implements its policy myopically. We will determine 
whether the central bank with bounded rationality can replicate optimal policy. 
We assume that the central bank short-run (period) loss function equals the following 
relationship ( ) ( )212b b bt t t t tL π π λ⎡= − + −⎢⎣ ? ? 2b ⎤⎥⎦
1
, where the central bank uses state-contingent 
inflation and employment rate targets (i.e., 0 1=
b
tg gπ −+ ?   and ). Since we 
design (choose) the parameters of the central bank loss function, we do not optimize 
myopically, even though the central banker does. That is, we minimize the infinite horizon 
social loss function with the knowledge that the central banker, who actually implements 
policy, only optimizes myopically. That is, the optimizing problem is expressed as follows: 
0 1
b
th h −= +? 1?
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(44)  
( ) ( )
( ) (
( )
( )
0 1 0 1
2 21 * *
0
, , , , 1
2 2
0 1 1 0 1 1
1
1
1min
2
1min
2
. .
. .
b
t
t
t tg g h h t
b
t t t t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
E
g g h h
s t
s t
E
λ
π
β π π λ
π λ
ρ α π π ε
π π
∞ −
=
− −
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ )⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎨ ⎧ = + − +⎪⎪ ⎨⎪ =⎪⎩⎩
∑ ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
. 
As before, we solve this model in two steps and obtain an infinite number of optimal 
central bank period loss functions. With additional assumptions, we pin down the unique 
reasonable central bank period loss function from the infinite number of optimal candidates. 
Specifically, Step I computes the consistent or equilibrium outcomes for the inflation and 
employment rates, given that the central bank makes policy myopically from the central bank 
period loss function. Step II chooses the parameters, 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , for the central 
bank loss function to minimize the expected social loss. Once again, an infinite combination 
of parameters exits that minimizes the expected social loss. In order to determine a unique 
solution, we choose the same parameter set as in Step II to minimize the central bank loss 
function. 
Through the above steps, we determine the optimal central bank short-run loss 
function as follows:20
(45)  ( ) ( )2 212b b bt t t t tL π π λ b⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? ,  
where * 1, , and [ /(1
b b b
t t t
2 )]π π ρ λ λ βρ−= = = −? ? . This outcome proves identical to the 
long-run central bank period loss function in equation (30).  
Now, we can guess that the first-order condition of (45) must equal equation (34) or 
(38), because monetary policy under the short-run loss function (45) replicates optimal policy. 
                                                        
20 See Appendix C for details. 
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Obviously, the first-order condition of (45) equals: 
(46)  , ( ) ( )* 1 0bt t tπ π λ ρ −− + − =? ?
where 2[ /(1 )]bλ λ βρ= − . Policy rule (46) replicates the rule (34) or (38). 
Why does the central bank short-run loss function coincide with the period loss 
function of the long-run loss function? Notice from Appendix A, equation (A-26) that 
1 2 0γ γ= = . This means that the central bank minimizes the intertemporal loss at zero with 
0 for all t tε = , implying that the minimization of each period’s loss occurs at zero, too. 
Conversely, if the central bank minimizes each period’s loss at zero, then the minimization of 
the intertemporal loss also occurs at zero. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents four ways of optimal policymaking, committing to the social loss 
function, using discretion and the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions, and 
following monetary policy rules. They all lead to optimal economic performance. The same 
performance emerges from these different policymaking methods because the central bank 
actually follows the same (similar) policy rules. Based on the results, we conclude that what 
matters in optimal policymaking is the way of policymaking.21  
Specifically, the optimal policy benchmark comes from committing to the 
intertemporal social loss function subject to the economic structure. Then the benchmark 
optimal policy provides the goal for designing the central bank long-run and short-run loss 
functions, as well as the optimal policy rule. In short, the designed central bank long-run and 
short-run loss functions, as well as the optimal policy rule, emerge from optimizing the 
                                                        
21 We assume a perfect-information and, thus, the public knows how the central bank implements its policy. 
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intertemporal social loss function and the economic structure.  
We reconcile consistent and optimal outcomes in our model structure. In our paper, 
the implementation of optimal monetary policy relies on perfect knowledge of the economic 
structure. The effects of economic model uncertainty on policymaking lie beyond our scope. 
What implications emerge from these theoretical results for monetary policy? The 
three objectives (the social welfare criterion, central-bank long-run and short-run objectives) 
and optimal policy rules together constitute a regime for optimal policy making. The social 
intertemporal welfare function informs the public about the final objective of monetary policy. 
It provides the ultimate objective for monetary policy. The central bank long-run and 
short-run objective functions provide the means for achieving the ultimate social welfare 
objective. The public can understand the intermediate objectives of monetary policy, that is, 
how the central bank optimizes its objective function to achieve the social welfare optimum. 
In addition, monetary policy gains credibility and accountability with the intermediate and 
attainable objectives. The policy rules make monetary policy operational for the central bank. 
In other words, the social welfare criterion establishes the ultimate objective, central-bank 
long-run and short-run objectives provide the means to the end, and policy rules provide an 
operational short cut. 
In conclusion, we advocate assigning objectives, not rules, for the central bank. First, 
we argue that “a central bank should have instrument independence, but should not have goal 
independence.” (Fischer, 1995, p. 202). Second, the operations of the central bank becomes 
clear with explicit objectives. Specifically, the social welfare criterion and the central bank 
long-run and short-run objectives, as understood by the public, increases policy credibility 
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and accountability. “Specifying explicit objectives, together with operational independence 
and effective accountability structures is rightly considered essential in an effective 
monetary-policy setup” (Svensson, 2003, p. 454) Third, competent central bankers do not 
need instructions on how to operate monetary policy, if delegated clear objectives. With 
instrument independence, central bankers can optimize the delegated objectives. Finally, with 
explicit policy objectives, the public can easily understand monetary policy and, thus, make 
good choices. The public must infer, which they can do, the implied policy objectives, if 
monetary policy rules are delegated to the central bank 
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Appendix A  Design of Central Bank Long-Run Loss Functions 
The model for determining the long-run central bank loss function is given as follows: 
(A-1) 
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⎧ ⎧ ⎫)1 1⎡ ⎤⋅ − − + − −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎪⎨ ⎧ = + − +⎪⎪ ⎨⎪ =⎪⎩⎩
∑
∑
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
. 
As noted in Section 3, we solve this model in two steps and obtain an infinite number of 
optimal central bank loss functions. With additional assumptions, we pin down the unique 
reasonable central bank loss function from the infinite number of optimal candidates. We 
denote this last step as Step III. Specifically, Step I computes the consistent, or equilibrium, 
policy when given the following short-run central bank loss function: 
(A-2)  ( ) ( ){ }2 20 1 1 0 1 112b bt t t t tL g g h hπ λ− −= − + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦? ? ? .  
The consistent, or equilibrium, policy comes from minimizing the long-run discounted 
central bank loss function by choosing the path for the inflation rate (i.e., ). Step II 
minimizes the long-run expected social loss function by choosing the parameters, 
1{ }t tπ ∞=
0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , which come from the short-run central-bank loss function. Finally, 
Step III pins down the precise central-bank loss function by choosing the parameters, 
0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , to minimize the long-run central bank loss function. 
Step I: Derivation of Consistent Policy, Given the Central Bank Loss Function 
We first minimize the long-run central-bank loss function by choosing the path of the 
inflation rate. The following specifies the optimization problem: 
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(A-3)  
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∑ ? ? ?
? ? . 
The Bellman equation for determining the optimal policy and outcomes from the 
optimization is given as follows: 
(A-4)  ( ) ( ){ }1 1 min
t
b
t t t tV E L Vπ β− −= +? ? , 
where  is given in equation (A-2). We minimize this relationship subject to the structure 
of the economy, given in equations (3) and (4). 
b
tL
The solution for  must equal a quadratic form, since we minimize a quadratic 
objective function with linear constraints. Thus, the hypothesized solution equals the 
following equation: 
1( tV −? )
(A-5)  ( ) 20 1 212t tV tγ γ γ= + +? ? ? , 
where we need to determine the unknown coefficients in equation (A-5). 
The first-order condition for the minimization of equation (A-4) yields the following: 
(A-6)  ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0bt t t t tg g h hπ λ α αβ γ γ− −− + + − + + + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦? ? ? ? . 
Rearranging the terms and substituting ( )1 et t t t tρ α π π ε−= + − +? ?  into the above 
equation produces the following: 
(A-7)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
0 0 1 1 1 1 2
2
2 2 0.
b b b
t t
b e b
t t t
g h g hπ λ α αβγ λ α α λ βγ ρ
α λ βγ π π α λ βγ ε
1t− −− + − − + + +
+ + − + + =
? ?
 
Finding the expected value of equation (A-7) and solving for the solutions for the 
inflation rate and employment gives the following results:  
(A-8)  ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 1 1 1 2 1 (1 )b b bt t tqg h g hπ α λ βγ λ α αρ λ βγ εα− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − + + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ?  and 
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(A-9)  1t t q tρ ε−= +? ? , 
where { }22 2( , ) 1 [1 ( )]b bq q λ γ α λ βγ= = + + . 
Now, compute ( ) ( ){ }1 1 min
t
b
t t t tV E L Vπ β− −= +? ?  with the solutions for  and t tπ ?  in 
equations (A-8) and (A-9) and compare the coefficients with equation (A-5). Thus, 
(A-10)  ( ) ( )2 2 22 1 2 1b b bh h 2γ λ α αρ λ βγ λ ρ βγ ρ⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦  or ( )2 2 1,b hγ γ λ≡ , and 
(A-11)  ( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 1 2 0 1b b b bh h h h 1γ α λ βγ λ α αρ λ βγ λ ρ βγ ρ⎡ ⎤= − − + + − +⎣ ⎦  or  
   ( )1 1 0 1, ,b h hγ γ λ≡ . 
In sum, the consistent or equilibrium outcomes for the inflation rate and employment 
appear in equations (A-8) and (A-9) with 2( , )
bq q λ γ= ,  and 
. 
(2 2 1,b hγ γ λ≡ )
( )1 1 0 1, ,b h hγ γ λ≡
Step II: Determining the Central Bank Loss Function that Minimizes the Expected 
Social Loss 
Given our solution for the consistent or equilibrium outcomes for inflation and employment 
that depend on the parameters of the central bank loss function (i.e., 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ ), 
we now choose values for those parameters to minimize the expected intertemporal social 
loss. The analytical problem equals the following: 
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To solve this problem requires the recursive substitution for 1t−?  back to  in the 
consistent outcomes in equations (A-8) and (A-9) and then substituting the solutions into the 
social intertemporal welfare (loss) function. Carrying out the algebra leads to the following 
0?
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solution for the expected social loss: 
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and 
(A-15)  
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. 
L(I) and L(II) equal the components of the social welfare (loss) function that 
incorporates non-stochastic and stochastic terms, respectively. Choosing the values for the 
following parameters, 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , to minimize the expected social loss yields the 
following conditions: 
(A-16)  ( ) *0 0 1 0bg hα λ βγ π+ − − =
) =
, 
(A-17)  , and ( ) (1 1 2 0b bg hλ α αρ λ βγ+ − +
(A-18)  
2
2 2
2
1 1
1 ( ) 1b
q βρ 2α λ βγ βρ λα
⎧ ⎫ −= =⎨ ⎬+ + − +⎩ ⎭
. 
As long as the 7 parameters, 0 1 0 1 1,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h 2λ γ γ , of the central bank loss 
function satisfy equations (A-10), (A-11), (A-16), (A-17), and (A-18), the consistent policy 
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will prove optimal. Note also that by using equations (A-16) and (A-17), we can rewrite 
equations (A-10) and (A-11) as follows: 
(A-19)  [ ] ( )2 2 22 1 1 2bg hγ λ ρ βγ= + − + ρ  or [ ] ( )
2 2
1 1
2 21
bg hλ ργ βρ
+ −= − ,  and 
(A-20)  ( )[ ] ( )*1 0 1 0 1 1bg g h hγ π λ ρ β= − + − + γ ρ  or ( )[ ] ( )*0 1 0 11 1
bg g h hπ λ ργ βρ
− + −= − . 
By using equations (A-16) to (A-18), the consistent policy outcomes for the inflation 
and employment rates (A-8) and (A-9) equal: 
(A-21)  * 2 21t t
λαπ π εβρ λα= − − +  and 
(A-22)  
2
1 2 2
1
1t t
βρ
tρ εβρ λα−
−= + − +? ? , 
which equal their optimal outcomes. See equations (8) and (9). 
Step III: Determining the Central Bank Loss Function that Minimizes the Its Expected 
Loss 
An infinite number of solutions for the parameters 0 1 0 1 1,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h 2λ γ γ  satisfy 
equations (A-16) to (A-20) and minimize the social loss function. Only one set of those 
parameter values, however, will also minimize the central bank loss function. That is, we 
want to choose parameter values for 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  ,  and 
bg g h h λ  to solve the following problem: 
(A-23)  
( ) ( ){ }
0 1 0 1
2 21
0 0 1 1 0 1
, , , , 1
*
2 2
2
1 2 2
1min
2
1
. .
1
1
b
t b
t t t tg g h h t
t t
t t t
E g g h h
s t
λ
β π λ
λαπ π εβρ λα
βρρ εβρ λα
∞ −
− −
=
−
⎧ ⎫− + + − + 1⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = −⎪ − +⎪⎨ −⎪ = +⎪ − +⎩
∑ ? ? ?
? ?
. 
 The solution of this problem first requires the recursive substitution for  back to 
 into the employment rate equation. Then substitute the values of the optimal inflation and 
1t−?
0?
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employment rates into the central bank loss function and calculate the value of the expected 
central bank loss as follows: 
(A-24)  
( ) ({ ) }
( ) ( )
2 21
0 0 1 1 0 1
1
I II
b t b
t t t t
t
b b
L E g g h h
L L
β π λ∞ − − −
=
≡ − + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎣ ⎦ ⎣
≡ +
∑ ? ? ? 1 ⎤⎦
, 
where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2* *
0 1 0 02
22 2
0 1 0 0 12
1 1 2I
1 11
1 1 2
1 11
b
b b b
L g g g g
h h h h
π πβ βρβρ
λ λ ρ λβ ββρ
≡ − + + −− −−
+ + − + −− −−
? ?
? ?
1 0
0ρρ
 
and
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 22
2 2
1 2 2 2 22
22
2 2 2
1 2 2 2
1 1II
11 11 1
1 1
11 1 1
b
b b
L g
h
βρ β λασ σββρ λα βρ λαβ βρ
βρ βλ ρ σ λ σββρ λα β βρ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−≡ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−− + − +− − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−+ − +⎜ ⎟ −− + − −⎝ ⎠
. 
Lb(I) and Lb(II) equal the components of the social welfare (loss) function that 
incorporates non-stochastic and stochastic terms, respectively. Choosing the values for the 
following parameters, 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , to minimize the expected central bank loss 
yields the following results:  
(A-25)  *0 1 0 1, 0, 0 and g g h hπ ρ= = = = .  
Substituting these conditions into equations (A-19) and (A-20) yields: 
(A-26)  1 2 0γ γ= = . 
Using equation (A-18) and the definition of q that follows equation (A-9) produces: 
(A-27)  2[ /(1 )]bλ λ βρ= − . 
Finally we determine the optimal central bank long-run loss function as follows: 
(A-28)  ( ) ( )2 212b b bt t t t tL π π λ b⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? ,  
where * 2-1,  = , and [ /(1 )]
b b b
t t tπ π ρ λ λ βρ= =? ? − . 
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Appendix B  Design of Monetary Policy Rules 
The model for determining the monetary policy rule equals the following:  
(B-1)  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 21 * *
0, , , 1
1
1
1
1min
2
. .
t
t ta b c d t
e
t t t t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
E
a b c d
s t
E
β π π λ
π π ε
ρ α π π ε
π π
∞ −
=
−
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = + + +⎪⎪ = + − +⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
∑ ? ?
?
? ?
. 
Solve the model in two steps. Step I computes the equilibrium policy under the given policy 
rule, 1
e
t t ta b c d tπ π −= + + +? ε
t
t
. Step II chooses the parameters, a, b, c and d for the policy 
rule to minimize the expected total social loss. 
Step I: Determination of Consistent Policy, Given the Policy Rule 
When the central bank just follows the rule in equation (39) and interacts with the private 
sector, the problem equals: 
(B-2)  ( )
( )
1
1
1
e
t t t
e
t t t t
e
t t t
a b c d
E
π π ε
ρ α π π ε
π π
−
−
−
⎧ = + + +⎪⎪ = + − +⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
?
? ? . 
Solving for the equilibrium outcomes for the inflation and employment rates yields the 
following: 
(B-3)  11 1t t
a c d
b b t
π ε−= + +− − ?  and 
(B-4)  ( )1 1t t d tρ α ε−= + +? ? . 
Step II: Determining the Policy Rule that Minimizes the Expected Social Loss 
Now, choose the parameters a, b, c, and d to minimize the expected total social loss, given the 
equilibrium outcomes. That is, solve the following problem: 
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(B-5)  
( ) ( )
( )
2 21 * *
0, , , 1
1
1
1min
2
. . 1 1
1
t
t ta b c d t
t t t
t t t
E
a c d
s t b b
d
β π π λ
π ε
ρ α ε
∞ −
=
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = + +⎪ − −⎨⎪ = + +⎩
∑ ? ?
?
? ?
. 
We need first to substitute recursively into the equilibrium outcomes for the inflation 
and employment rates for  back to  and then calculate the expected value of the 
social loss function as follows: 
1t−? 0?
(B-6)  ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 * *0
1
I It t t
t
L E L Lβ π π λ∞ −
=
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤≡ − + − ≡⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∑ ? ? I+
where 
(B-7)  
( )
( )
2 2
* 2
0 02
2* * 2
2
0 02
1 1 1I 2
1 1 1 1 1 11
2
1 1 1
a c aL
b b b
π πβ βρβρ
λ λρ λρ
β βρ βρ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≡ − + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − − − − −−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
+ − +− − −
? ?
? ? ? ?
* c
b
 
and 
(B-8)  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
2 22 2
2 2
2 2
1II 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 .
1
cL d d
b
d
βα σ λ α σβ βρ β βρ
σβ
⎛ ⎞≡ + + +⎜ ⎟− − − − −⎝ ⎠
+ −
 
L(I) and L(II) equal the components of the social welfare (loss) function that 
incorporate non-stochastic and stochastic terms, respectively. Choosing the values for the 
following parameters, , to minimize the expected social loss yields the 
following conditions:  
,  ,  ,   a b c and d
(B-9)  *,
(1 )
a
b
π=−  
(B-10)  0,
(1 )
c
b
=−  
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(B-11)  2 21
d λαβρ λα= − − +  
As a result, the optimal policy equals the following: 
(B-12)  ( ) * 2 21 1et tb b t
λαπ π π βρ λα= − + − − + ε
1
, 
where . The equilibrium inflation and employment rates equal the following: 0 b≤ <
(B-13)  * 2 21t t
λαπ π εβρ λα= − − +  and 
(B-14)  
2
1 2 2
1
1t t
βρ
tρ εβρ λα−
−= + − +? ? , 
which equal the optimal outcomes. See equations (8) and (9). 
Appendix C  Design of Central Bank Short-Run Loss Functions 
The optimizing problem equals the following system: 
(C-1)  
( ) ( )
( ) (
( )
( )
0 1 0 1
2 21 * *
0
, , , , 1
2 2
0 1 1 0 1 1
1
1
1min
2
1min
2
. .
. .
b
t
t
t tg g h h t
b
t t t t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
E
g g h h
s t
s t
E
λ
π
β π π λ
π λ
ρ α π π ε
π π
∞ −
=
− −
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ )⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎨ ⎧ = + − +⎪⎪ ⎨⎪ =⎪⎩⎩
∑ ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
. 
Step I: Derivation of Consistent Policy, Given the Central Bank Loss Function 
To determine the consistent or equilibrium outcomes, we solve the following problem:  
(C-2)  
( ) (
( )
( )
2 2
0 1 1 0 1 1
1
1
1min
2
. .
t
b
t t t t
e
t t t t t
e
t t t
g g h h
s t
E
π π λ
ρ α π π ε
π π
− −
−
−
)⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎣ ⎦
⎧ = + − +⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
? ? ?
? ? . 
The equilibrium inflation and employment outcomes equal the following: 
(C-3)  ( )0 0 1 1 1b b bt tg h g h b tqπ λ α λ α λ αρ λ α ε−= + + + − −?  and 
(C-4)  1t t q tρ ε−= +? ? , 
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where 2[1/(1 )]bq λ α≡ + . 
Step II: Determining the Central Bank Loss Function that Minimizes the Expected 
Social Loss 
Now, we choose the parameters, 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , to minimize the expected total social 
loss. The problem equals the following system: 
(C-5)  
( ) ( )
( )
0 1 0 1
2 21 * *
0
, , , , 1
0 0 1 1 1
1
1min
2
. .
b
t
t tg g h h t
b b b
t t
t t t
E
g h g h
s t
q
λ
β π π λ
b
tqπ λ α λ α λ αρ λ α ε
ρ ε
∞ −
=
−
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⋅ − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
⎧ = + + + − −⎪⎨ = +⎪⎩
∑ ? ?
?
? ?
 
We need first to substitute recursively into the equilibrium outcomes for the inflation 
and employment rates for  back to  and then calculate the expected value of the 
social loss function as follows: 
1t−? 0?
(C-6)  ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 * *0
1
I It t t
t
L E L Lβ π π λ∞ −
=
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤≡ − + − ≡⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∑ ? ? I+
where  
(C-7)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2 2* 2
0 0 1 12
2*
*
0 0 1 1 0
* 2
2
0 02
1 1I
1 1
2
1 1
2  
1 1
b b
b b b
L g h g h
g h g h
λ α π λ α λ αρβ βρ
λλ α π λ α λ αρβρ β
λρ λρ
βρ βρ
= + − + + −− −
+ + − + − +− −
− +− −
?
??
? ? ?
0
b
 
and 
(C-8)  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )
2
22 2
1 1 2
2
2
2
1 1II
11 1
1 1
b b qL q g h
q
β 2λ α λ αρ σ σβ αβ βρ
λ σβ βρ
−⎛ ⎞= + − + ⎜ ⎟−− − ⎝ ⎠
+ − −
. 
L(I) and L(II) equal the components of the social welfare (loss) function that 
 37
incorporate non-stochastic and stochastic terms, respectively. Choosing the values for the 
following parameters, 0 1 0 1,  ,  ,  , and 
bg g h h λ , to minimize the expected social loss yields the 
following conditions:  
(C-9)   , *0 0 0
bg hλ α π+ − =
(C-10)   , and 1 1 0
b bg hλ α λ αρ+ − =
(C-11)   
2
2 2 2
1 1         
1 1 1
b
bq
βρ λλ 2λ α βρ λα β
−⎧ ⎫= = ⇒ =⎨ ⎬− − + −⎩ ⎭ ρ . 
As a result, the equilibrium inflation and employment outcomes equal the following: 
(C-12)  * 2 21t t
λαπ π εβρ λα= − − +  and 
(C-13)  
2
1 2 2
1
1t t
βρ
tρ εβρ λα−
−= + − +? ? , 
which equal the optimal outcomes. See equations (8) and (9). 
As long as the four parameters, ,0 1 0,  ,  , and g g h h1
1
1
                                                       
22 of the central bank loss function 
satisfy equations (C-9) and (C-10), the consistent policy under the myopic central bank 
proves optimal.  
Step III: Determining the Central Bank Loss Function that Minimizes Its Expected Loss 
An infinite number of solutions for the parameters  satisfy equations (C-9) 
and (C-10) and minimize the expected social loss. Only one set of those parameter values will 
also minimize the central bank short-run (period) loss function, where the central bank 
operates myopically. That is, we want to choose parameter values for  to 
solve the following problem: 
0 1 0,  ,  , and g g h h
0 1 0,  ,  , and g g h h
 
22 Equation (C-11) pins down the value of bλ . 
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(C-14)  
( ) ({ ) }
0 1 0 1
2 2
1 0 1 1 0 1 1, , ,
*
2 2
2
1 2 2
1min
2
1
. .
1
1
b
t t t t tg g h h
t t
t t t
E g g h h
s t
π λ
λαπ π εβρ λα
βρρ εβρ λα
− −
−
− + + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎣ ⎦ ⎣
⎧ = −⎪ − +⎪⎨ −⎪ = +⎪ − +⎩
? ? ?
? ?
− ⎤⎦
1
. 
Since the central bank operates myopically, we do not need to recursively substitute 
for  back to . Thus, we merely substitute the consistent or equilibrium outcomes into 
the central bank loss function and minimize with respect to . The expected 
value of the central bank loss function with the consistent or equilibrium outcomes reduces to 
the following: 
1t−? 0?
0 1 0,  ,  , and g g h h
(C-15)  
( ) ( ) ( )22 2* 21 0 1 1 0 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 .
2
b b
t t t t
b
qE L g g h h
q
π σ λα
λ σ
− −
−⎛ ⎞= − + + + + − 1ρ −⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
+
? ?
 
 Choosing the parameters  to minimize the expected value of the 
central bank loss function produces the following results: 
0 1 0,  ,  , and g g h h1
(C-16)    and *0 1 1 0tg gπ −− + =?
(C-17)   ( )0 1 1 0th h ρ −+ − =? . 
To make the inflation target in the central bank loss function independent of the state variable 
, a reasonable assumption, we set the parameter values as follows: 1t−?
(C-18)   *0 1 0 1, 0, 0 and g g h hπ ρ= = = = . 
Finally, this produces the optimal central bank loss function as follows: 
(C-19)  ( ) ( )2 212b b bt t t t tL π π λ b⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? , 
where * 1, , and [ /(1
b b b
t t t
2 )]π π ρ λ λ βρ−= = = −? ? . This loss function matches the loss 
function derived for the long-run intertemporal optimizing central bank. See equation (30). 
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